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Dendrophobia in bonobo comprehension of spoken
English∗
Robert Truswell
Abstract
Comparative data from Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993) concerning the comprehension of
spoken English requests by a bonobo (Kanzi) and a human infant (Alia) is consistent with
Fitch’s (2014) hypothesis that humans exhibit dendrophilia, or a propensity to infer and
manipulate hierarchical tree structures to a greater extent than other species. This body of
data avoids many pitfalls in interpreting results of relevant Artificial Grammar Learning
experiments, and therefore complements those experiments. However, findings from lan-
guage acquisition suggest that the term dendrophilia is misleading, in that human infants do
not show an initial preference for certain hierarchical syntactic structures. Infants are slow
to acquire and generalize the hierarchical structures in question, but they can eventually do
so. Kanzi, in contrast, is dendrophobic: even though his nonhierarchial strategy impairs
comprehension, he never acquires the hierarchical structure.
∗Thanks to Jim Hurford, Ray Jackendoff, Tim O’Donnell, Sarah O’Neill, Ian Roberts,
Kenny Smith, Maggie Tallerman, Charles Yang, and Moira Yip, and to audiences at Tufts,
Groningen, York, Edinburgh, and Essex, for comments on earlier versions of this material.
Address for correspondence: Linguistics and English Language, The University of Edin-
burgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles St, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, UK
Email: rob.truswell@ed.ac.uk
1. Introduction
Much of our knowledge is hierarchically organized. A major type of hierarchally organized
information concerns the relation between complex objects and their component parts, or
constituents, represented diagrammatically using tree diagrams. The centrality of such
structured knowledge representations to many aspects of human cognition has been recog-
nized since at least Lashley (1951). Models of human language (Chomsky 1957), planning
(Miller et al. 1960), vision (Marr 1982), music (Lerdahl & Jackendoff 1983), and sev-
eral other domains routinely refer to such structures. This led Fitch (2014) to formulate his
Dendrophilia hypothesis, as a general claim about human processing of sequential strings:
‘Humans have a multi-domain capacity and proclivity to infer tree structures
from strings, to a degree that is difficult or impossible for most non-human
animal species.’ (Fitch 2014:352)
Fitch’s hypothesis is stated as a matter of degree: humans do not necessarily see trees
everywhere, and nonhuman animals may relate strings to hierarchical structures in some
cases, but humans are more ready to infer tree structures from strings. Conversely, we may
hypothesize that nonhuman animals are dendrophobic to the extent that they fail to infer
optimal, hierarchically structured representations of sets of strings.
In this respect, the Dendrophilia hypothesis differs from similar claims made in Hauser,
Chomsky & Fitch (2002). Hauser et al. advanced the ‘recursion-only’ hypothesis, that FLN
(the ‘faculty of language in the narrow sense’, or the set of species-specific and domain-
specific components of the language faculty) contains only the capacity to recursively
embed constituents within larger constituents. Whereas the recursion-only hypothesis is
absolute and domain-specific (recursive computation is unique to humans and unique to
language), the Dendrophilia hypothesis is relative and domain-general (humans are more
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likely to use hierarchical structural representations, across multiple domains).
Both the recursion-only hypothesis and the Dendrophilia hypothesis imply a series of
comparisons, across species and domains. Hauser et al. already consider recursive aspects
of numerical cognition in humans and other species (pp.1576–7), and in their conclusion
(p.1578) they list a number of other domains where cross-species comparison may well
contribute usefully to evaluation and refinement of the recursion-only hypothesis. Pinker
& Jackendoff (2005), and Jackendoff & Pinker (2005), pursue this further with a simple
demonstration of apparent recursive constituent structure in human visual cognition. Al-
though there is still ongoing debate over this question, such arguments, as well as the work
on planning, music, and vision listed above, strongly suggest that hierarchical constituent
structure is not unique to language, contrary to the recursion-only hypothesis. Indeed,
Hauser et al. contemplate this possibility in their conclusion:
If . . . one entertains the hypothesis that recursion evolved to solve other com-
putational problems such as navigation, number quantification, or social rela-
tionships, then it is possible that other animals have such abilities. . . If we find
evidence for recursion in animals, but in a noncommunicative domain, then we
are more likely to pinpoint the mechanisms underlying this ability and the se-
lective pressures that led to it. This discovery, in turn, would open the door to
another suite of puzzles: Why did humans, but no other animal, take the power
of recursion to create an open-ended and limitless system of communication?
Why does our system of recursion operate over a broader range of elements or
inputs (e.g., numbers, words) than other animals? One possibility, consistent
with current thinking in the cognitive sciences, is that recursion in animals rep-
resents a modular system designed for a particular function (e.g., navigation)
and impenetrable with respect to other systems. During evolution, the modular
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and highly domain-specific system of recursion may have become penetrable
and domain-general. This opened the way for humans, perhaps uniquely, to
apply the power of recursion to other problems. (Hauser et al. 2002: 1578)
The Dendrophilia hypothesis can be seen as embodying this train of thought. If tenable,
it is still strong enough to contribute to our understanding of the uniqueness of human lan-
guage, the question motivating Hauser et al. (2002): human language is apparently unique
among communication systems in allowing unbounded, novel pairing of complex forms
recursively constructed from simpler elements, with complex meanings recursively con-
structed from the meanings of the simpler elements. In this way, an ability to manipulate
recursively generated hierarchical constituent structures underpins a distinctive feature of
human language.
This paper is a contribution to the assessment of the Dendrophilia hypothesis with re-
spect to the core domain of grammar induction, or inference of rule systems underpin-
ning strings of sounds. A substantial comparative literature on artificial grammar learning
has emerged, following Fitch & Hauser’s (2004) demonstration that humans can learn to
recognize sequences corresponding to the rule schemata (ab)n and anbn, while cotton-top
tamarins can only learn the former. Fitch (2014) discusses this result as support for the
Dendrophilia hypothesis. However, its pertinence to a literal interpretation of Dendrophilia
is unclear, for reasons discussed in Section 2.
In large part, this unclarity reflects limitations of the experimental paradigm as applied
to nonhuman subjects. This paper offers a complementary source of evidence support-
ing Fitch & Hauser’s conclusion, by examining the behavioural responses of a nonhuman
primate to spoken English, a hierarchically structured, semantically interpreted natural lan-
guage. We can infer aspects of the subject’s interpretation of an utterance from his be-
haviour, and aspects of the grammatical representation of the utterance from that interpre-
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tation.
The data come from a corpus of 660 utterances directed to the bonobo Kanzi, together
with descriptions of Kanzi’s behaviour in response (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993). We
also discuss Savage-Rumbaugh et al.’s parallel corpus of requests directed at Alia, a hu-
man infant, over a 6-month period when she was 18–24 months old. Kanzi’s generally
impressive performance dips significantly when he is asked to act on multiple objects de-
scribed by a coordinate noun phrase. Alia showed no such problem. I argue that this is
an instance of dendrophobia on the part of Kanzi, that is, failure to infer a hierarchical
grammatical structure even when correct interpretation depends on that structure.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews recent artificial grammar learning
experiments. Section 3 discusses Kanzi’s comprehension of spoken English and relates it
to those experiments, showing how the two approaches reinforce each other. I show that
Kanzi fails to interpret coordinated noun phrase objects, as predicted by the Dendrophilia
hypothesis. Section 4 relates Kanzi’s performance to research on the acquisition of coordi-
nate structures by human infants. Children only slowly acquire the tree structures necessary
for correct comprehension of coordinate NPs. This suggests that the inter-species differ-
ence is more accurately characterized as dendrophobia on the part of Kanzi, rather than
human dendrophilia. Section 5 concludes.
2. Hierarchical Structure and Artificial Grammar Learning
Fitch & Hauser (2004) tested humans and cotton-top tamarins on their ability to recognize
strings conforming to one of two patterns. Each string is composed from two different
types of consonant–vowel speech syllable, a and b, clearly distinguishable along several
perceptual dimensions. One pattern, (ab)n, consists of repeated groups of a single a syllable
followed by a single b syllable. The other pattern, anbn, consists of a certain number of a
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syllables followed by the same number of b syllables.
Fitch & Hauser found that after familiarization to this pattern, tamarins recognized the
(ab)n pattern, as indicated by an increased number of looks to stimuli inconsistent with the
pattern, but did not recognize the anbn pattern. Adult humans, in contrast, easily recognized
both patterns.1
This result is taken to be revealing because of differences in the expressive power of
grammars required to represent these two patterns in the limit. (ab)n can be generated by a
regular grammar, or a grammar where each rewrite rule is of the form A→ xB, or A→ y,
where A and B are nonterminal nodes and x and y are terminal nodes. A regular grammar
for generating (ab)n is in Figure 1.
Figure 1 also contains a tree diagram representing the structure assigned by that gram-
mar to the string ababab. Although this represents a hierarchical structure of sorts, the
tree diagram does not add any further information beyond that encoded in the string, in the
sense that each constituent represented in the tree diagram corresponds to a final substring
of ababab. This general property of regular grammars is related to Chomsky’s (1956, 1959)
claim that regular grammars cannot represent phrase structure in the general case.
No regular grammar can generate anbn for arbitrary n (Chomsky 1956).2 In brief, the
1Several papers (Perruchet & Rey 2005, Hochmann et al. 2008, de Vries et al. 2008)
have disputed this claim, on various empirical grounds. Likewise, similar experiments have
reported similar results, sometimes with significant qualifications, across a range of species
and stimulus types (Gentner et al. 2005, van Heijningen et al. 2009, Abe & Watanabe
2011, ten Cate & Okanoya 2012, Stobbe et al. 2012). Here, we are not concerned with the
robustness or generality of the original finding, and focus instead on its relevance to the
Dendrophilia hypothesis.
2If n is restricted to some finite set of values, anbn is a finite set of strings. Any finite
set of strings can be generated by a regular grammar, structured as a disjunction over those
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1. S→ aT
2. T → bS
3. T → b
S
a T
b S
a T
b S
a T
b
Figure 1: A regular grammar for generating (ab)n, along with a tree diagram for the string
ababab generated by the grammar.
reason is that generating anbn in the limit requires an arbitrary number of nonlocal depen-
dencies pairing each a with a corresponding b. Regular grammars can handle only a finite
number of nonlocal dependencies.
However, a simple context-free grammar can generate anbn. In a context-free gram-
mar, every rewrite rule in R is of the form A→ X , where A is a single nonterminal node and
X is some string formed by concatenation of nonterminal and terminal nodes. Because the
characterization of rewrite rules in context-free grammars is strictly more inclusive than
that for regular grammars, regular grammars form a proper subset of context-free gram-
mars. A context-free grammar for generating anbn is given in Figure 2, along with a tree
diagram for aaabbb.
Context-free grammars are of particular interest to linguists and cognitive scientists be-
cause they can be used to represent most observed phenomena in natural language syntax
(though not all — see Shieber 1985, and work such as Weir 1988 and Stabler 1997 on the
more expressive mildly context-sensitive family of grammar formalisms). However, the
strings. Accordingly, we are only interested in formal properties of these stringsets in the
limit.
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1. S→ aSb
2. S→ ab
S
a S
a S
a b
b
b
Figure 2: A context-free grammar for generating anbn, and a tree diagram for aaabbb.
anbn grammar is far from exploiting the full expressive power of the context-free formal-
ism. In particular, the anbn grammar makes use of only a single nonterminal symbol, S,
while context-free models of natural language grammar use multiple nonterminal symbols
to distinguish constituents of different categories. Context-free grammars with a single
nonterminal symbol are equivalent to counter grammars (Chomsky 1959), a formalism
that is strictly intermediate in expressive power between regular grammars and full context-
free grammars. Because anbn can be generated by formalisms with sub-context-free expres-
sive power, it is a poor stringset for diagnosing sensitivity to hierarchical structure of the
type associated with context-free models of human language processing.
Similarly, (ab)n is far from exploiting the full potential of the regular grammar for-
malism. (ab)n is a strictly 2-local stringset in the terms of Rogers & Pullum (2011). A
strictly 2-local stringset is one which can be recognized using a moving window two sym-
bols long. (ab)n is strictly 2-local because every bigram in the stringset must be a member
of the following set: {〈START,a〉,〈a,b〉,〈b,a〉,〈b,END〉}. Regular grammars generate a
proper superset of the strictly local stringsets. For example, Figure 3 describes a regular
grammar which generates strings containing a followed by b, or c followed by d. a cannot
be followed by d and c cannot be followed by b. However, arbitrarily many xs can be in-
serted between these two paired symbols. This guarantees that the pairing of the symbols
cannot be verified by any strictly local system.
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1. S→ aT
2. T → xT
3. T → b
4. S→ cU
5. U → xU
6. U → d
S
a T
x T
x T
b
S
c U
x U
d
Figure 3: A regular grammar which generates a stringset which is not strictly local, and
tree diagrams for two strings that it generates.
These four classes can be arranged in a strict hierarchy of expressive power, as follows:
Strictly 2-local ⊂ Regular ⊂ Counter ⊂ Context-free, thereby expanding the bottom half
of Chomsky’s (1959) hierarchy and allowing a more precise statement of the expressive
power required to generate different stringsets. Many researchers (Weir 1988, Rogers &
Pullum 2011, Ja¨ger & Rogers 2012, among others) have produced still more precise char-
acterizations of different levels of expressive power.
This is important because as our understanding of these subclasses grows, the distinc-
tion between (ab)n and anbn becomes less directly relevant to the Dendrophilia hypoth-
esis. When the two stringsets were first discussed in Chomsky (1956), only four classes
of grammar (regular grammars, context-free grammars, transformational grammars, and
unrestricted rewriting systems) were considered. Within that hypothesis space, a demon-
stration that anbn is supra-regular but context-free would mean that results about learning
of anbn directly inform hypotheses about manipulation of context-free hierarchical phrase
structure. Within a more expansive set of candidate grammar classes, such direct links
cannot be drawn. As Ja¨ger & Rogers write:
‘So what can one say about a mechanism that can learn a properly context-
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free pattern [like anbn]? For one thing, it is not finite-state. . . Beyond that,
there is very little if anything that we can determine about the nature of that
information and how it is used simply from the evidence that an organism can
learn the pattern.’ (Ja¨ger & Rogers 2012: 1962)
In particular, we cannot draw robust inferences about the Dendrophilia hypothesis from
comparisons of learning of anbn. To reinforce this point, we will take a brief detour into
automata theory.
For each class of grammar defined above, there is a corresponding class of automata.
These are useful from a cognitive perspective as automata capable of recognizing certain
patterns can be thought of as minimal models of minds with the same capabilities.
Strictly local stringsets are recognized by ‘moving window’ automata informally char-
acterized above — we will not be more precise about them here, but see the discussion of
‘k-limited automata’ in Chomsky (1963). Regular stringsets in the general case are rec-
ognized by finite-state automata. Figure 4 shows a diagram representing a finite-state
automaton for recognizing the language ax∗b | cx∗d from Figure 3 This diagram can be
interpreted as follows: the circles represent states, and the arrows represent transitions be-
tween states. We begin in the initial state S and follow the arrows until we reach the
accepting state E. Along the way, we add any symbols associated with the transition arcs
to the end of the output string. The nonlocal dependencies between a and b, or c and d,
are captured by the fact that the automaton can follow the loops in the intermediate states
arbitrarily often.
For every context-free grammar, there is an equivalent pushdown automaton, consist-
ing of a finite-state automaton augmented with memory in the form of a pushdown stack.
The transitions can manipulate the top element on that stack, as well as write output sym-
bols. A pushdown automaton for recognizing natural language data typically uses the stack
9
Sstart E
a
c
x
x
b
d
Figure 4: Finite-state automaton for recognizing the stringset ax∗b | cx∗d.
to record information about categories needed to complete a sentence. For example, an
automaton processing the English sentence The dog barks may encounter the determiner
the, and use the stack to record that the sentence can be completed by a noun followed by
a verb phrase, information implicit in context-free rewrite rules such as S→ NP VP and
NP→ D N.
The relationship between finite-state automata and pushdown automata makes it clear
that the difference between regular languages and context-free languages comes down to
memory: recognizing a context-free language requires an ability to remember a ‘to-do list’,
or a stack of nonterminal nodes which have not yet been expanded. Recognizing a regular
language requires only memory of a location in a transition network. Recognizing a strictly
2-local language needs only a memorized list of accepted bigrams.
Recognizing a counter grammar requires a type of memory intermediate between finite-
state automata and pushdown automata. A counter automaton for recognizing anbn is in
Figure 5, where +1 and −1 can be thought of as an abbreviation for ‘add an arbitrary sym-
bol to the stack’ and ‘remove a symbol from the stack’, respectively. As with a pushdown
automaton, the derivation terminates in an accepting state with an empty stack.
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start
a,+1
a,+1
b,-1
Figure 5: A counter automaton for recognizing anbn
In other words, counter grammars are unable to differentiate among symbols written
to the stack but can only manipulate the number of symbols on the stack. In contrast, a
pushdown automaton’s behaviour can be conditioned in different ways by different symbols
on the stack. A counter automaton therefore offers a formalization of the intuition that we
recognize anbn by counting, relating the type of memory required for counting to classes
of automata both more and less expressive. To the extent that the notion of phrase structure
is dependent on differentiation of phrasal categories (represented by symbols on the stack),
counter automata also demonstrate quite clearly that inferences from anbn to hierarchical
structure as found in natural language are invalid.
We should not be surprised that the full expressive power of a context-free grammar
or pushdown automaton is not used in recognizing anbn, because the hierarchical structure
generated by the context-free grammar in Figure 2 is an example of centre-embedding,
shown by Miller & Chomsky (1963) to seriously hinder sentence processing.3 As discussed
3Fitch has commented in several places (e.g. Fitch & Friederici 2012, Fitch 2014) that
it is important to distinguish notions such as supra-regularity, hierarchy, centre-embedding,
and recursion when discussing anbn. This advice is well taken. However, the notions are
not completely unrelated. If we are to use anbn to inform discussions of Dendrophilia, and
if a core domain in which Dendrophilia is in evidence is natural language, then we can
only evaluate the Dendrophilia hypothesis by considering anbn as generated by grammars
like those used in natural language. This appears to be the position of Fitch & Hauser
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SNP
people RC
NP
people RC
NP
people
VP/NP
left
VP/NP
left
VP
left
Figure 6: A tree diagram for the well-formed sentence of English People people people left
left left.
by Rogers & Pullum (2011), the strings people left, people people left left, people people
people left left left, and so on are all grammatical sentences of English, because people left
can function as a reduced relative clause modifying a preceding bare plural nominal, as
in Gifts people left were donated to charity. If people left can modify gifts, we assume it
can modify people. Accordingly, people1 people2 left2 left1 is derived from people1 left1
by attaching the modifier people2 left2 to people1.4 Accordingly, by induction, the string
peoplen leftn is a grammatical sentence of English for n≥ 1, with structures as in Figure 6.
However, the grammaticality of peoplen leftn is masked by the extreme processing diffi-
culty caused by recursive embedding of noun phrases in the middle of larger noun phrases,
(2004), who include a tree diagram for anbn showing recursive centre-embedding, and
Fitch (2014), who links anbn to his Dendrophilia hypothesis. Alternatively, if we see anbn
as merely supra-regular, then it tells us nothing about recursion or centre-embedding, but
also tells us nothing obvious about the Dendrophilia hypothesis. To relate anbn to phrase
structure without invoking recursive centre-embedding would be incoherent.
4The subscripts are added purely for clarity and have no theoretical status.
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and relative clauses in the middle of larger relative clauses. Although the impact of centre-
embedding on processability can be mitigated by certain semantic manipulations (Crain
& Steedman 1985), those manipulations involve greater differentiation among constituents
at different levels of embedding. Clearly, this does not apply in the case of peoplen leftn,
where there is no such differentiation.
Our inability to recognize the well-formedness of peoplen leftn should raise serious
doubts as to whether we use a centre-embedding context-free grammar to recognize anbn.
The existence of an analysis based on a counter grammar offers a plausible alternative,
but seriously problematizes any inferences about hierarchical structures in cognition on the
basis of comparisons between (ab)n and anbn.
Related conclusions are reached by Perruchet & Rey (2005) and Lai & Poletiek (2011),
among others. For example, Lai & Poletiek trained participants on stimuli constructed in
such a way that the choice of b element was contingent on the choice of a element: a
elements be and bi were paired with b elements po and pu, while a elements de and di
were paired with to and tu, and so on. In other words, bepo and dibepotu were well-formed
elements of this language, but beto and dibepopu were not, because an a element is paired
with an incorrect choice of b element. This contrasts with the grammar in Fitch & Hauser
(2004), which did not differentiate among subclasses of a-element and b-element. This
manipulation yields a grammar which requires a learner to track the dependencies between
a elements and b elements as represented in Figure 2, rather than simply count them. Lai
& Poletiek show that humans fail to learn this strictly context-free grammar except under
specific ‘starting small’ training regimes which include initial exposure to well-formed ab
pairs without centre-embedding. However, Rey, Perruchet & Fagot (2012) show that under
appropriate intensive training regimes (an average of 53,349 training trials per individual),
baboons can succeed at formally similar tasks, and prefer to use anbn orders with strictly
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nested dependencies over other anbn orders. Again, then, evidence from success at learning
anbn languages does not appear to support the Dendrophilia hypothesis directly.
In sum, comparisons between learning of (ab)n and anbn are unlikely to be particularly
informative about the Dendrophilia hypothesis. This is perhaps not an intrinsic problem
with artificial grammar learning experiments: as discussed in Rogers & Pullum (2011),
Fitch & Friederici (2012), and Ja¨ger & Rogers (2012), other stringsets may offer a more ac-
curate picture of the cognitive resources underpinning a given species’ pattern-recognition
abilities. However, such work is as yet inconclusive. In this paper, I turn to a complemen-
tary source of evidence.
3. The Kanzi Corpus
This section discusses a corpus of the behavioural responses of a bonobo, Kanzi, to 660
spoken English instructions, published in Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993). Although the
syntactic structure of these instructions is not as tightly controlled as in Fitch & Hauser’s
experiment, the data have four clear advantages. First, the test sentences directed at Kanzi
are all well-formed sentences of English, a language with hierarchical sentence structure.
It is therefore easier to relate the results to the Dendrophilia hypothesis. Second, the range
of structures used in the sentences directed at Kanzi is greater than in the Fitch & Hauser
experiment, providing indirect information about a wider range of representational capa-
bilities. Third, the structural information we will probe is independent of concerns relating
to centre-embedding, which removes one potential confound in interpreting the results. Fi-
nally, the sentences are interpreted by Kanzi, which provides a further source of indirect
information about the structures he assigns to the sentences he hears.
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3.1 Background
Kanzi acquired a high level of competence in an English-like communication system with-
out explicit instruction (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993, Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994,
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998). He quite quickly acquired a lexicon of several hundred
items, and showed a high degree of comprehension of English utterances, either spoken or
encoded on a special keyboard. The tests reported in Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993) are
intended as a measure of Kanzi’s comprehension. The instructions used are novel and un-
predictable, and presented in such a way to avoid unconscious cues from the experimenter.
Each item in the corpus is in the format shown in (1). First is an item number (I reproduce
this in lieu of a full citation — all items can be found in Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993:
111–210). Next is a code for the correctness of Kanzi’s response: C and C1–5 are correct,
but with increasing amounts of hesitation or human intervention; PC (Partially Correct),
OE (Object Error), and other codes describe a range of incorrect responses. Next, in italics,
is the sentence uttered. Finally, in parentheses, is a description of Kanzi’s actions and a
justification of the code assigned, if necessary.
(1) 287. (C) Kanzi, take the tomato to the colony room. (Kanzi makes a sound like
“orange”; he then takes both the tomato and the orange to the colony room.) [C
is scored because it is assumed that Kanzi is announcing that he wants to take an
orange and have it to eat.]
Our interest is in the distribution of ‘correct’ responses (coded C or C1–C5) versus incorrect
responses (including PC and OE) across different syntactic structures. Savage-Rumbaugh
et al. (1993: 77) give Kanzi’s overall accuracy across the corpus as 71.5%, slightly higher
than the 66.6% accuracy of Alia, a human infant tested on a similar set of utterances over a
6-month period starting when she was 18 months old. In Sections 3.2–3.3, we use Kanzi’s
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general high performance to investigate comprehension strategies which he is able to use,
before turning in Section 3.4 to a significant dip in performance which reveals an inability
to manipulate hierarchical syntactic representations, and therefore constitutes evidence for
dendrophobia in Kanzi’s grammar learning.
3.2 Comprehension without Structure-sensitivity
Although the instructions directed at Kanzi are novel, they are mainly built from predictable
parts: simple action descriptions such as give, put, show, take, and get, and a large class of
nominal expressions. The nature of the objects described by those nominal expressions is
a fairly reliable predictor of the way in which Kanzi is asked to interact with those objects.
In the test sentences, objects are generally given or shown to animate beings, placed in
receptacles, bodies of liquid, etc., and on objects that they cannot be placed in. If an object
is present in Kanzi’s immediate vicinity, it can be taken to a specified location. If the object
is not present, it can be retrieved from a specified location. Knowing what a noun refers
to therefore implies a default way of interacting with that object, and around 420/660, or
64%, of the instructions in Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993) ask Kanzi to act in this default
way.
Success on these trials alone would be consistent with the hypothesis that Kanzi has ac-
quired an impressive lexicon, can construe instructions as instructions, and can figure out
plausible responses based on an array of default actions and the properties of the named ob-
jects and events, but that he is lacking any syntactic and/or combinatorial semantic ability.
This would constitute what Anderson (2004) calls a ‘semantic soup’ strategy: the meanings
of the individual content words are formed into a coherent action description in whatever
way they fit best, without attention to any syntactic information in the signal.
However, there is evidence that Kanzi moves beyond semantic soup to a limited extent.
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In certain ‘reversible’ ditransitive sentence frames, semantic soup is insufficient to deter-
mine a correct mapping from words to argument roles. For example, in (2), either action is
equally plausible on the basis of the semantics of the individual lexical items alone. Sen-
sitivity to linear order is required to associate the right object with the right argument role:
the first noun encountered denotes a THEME and the second denotes a GOAL.
(2) a. 525. (C) Put the tomato in the oil. (Kanzi does so.)
b. 528. (C) Put some oil in the tomato. (Kanzi picks up the liquid Baby Magic
oil and pours it in a bowl with the tomato.)
There are 43 sentences presented in such alternations in the corpus (21 pairs, with one
sentence repeated, Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993: 95–6). Kanzi responds accurately to 33
of them (76.7%), in line with his 71.5% overall accuracy across the corpus.
This sensitivity to linear order represents a step beyond a ‘semantic soup’ interpretive
strategy. However, the Dendrophilia hypothesis is concerned with a further step: the ability
to make inferences about hierarchical structure from sequential information. Section 3.3
examines, and ultimately dismisses, some cases which initially appear to show sensitivity
to hierarchical structure. Next, Section 3.4 shows that Kanzi fails to infer hierarchical
structure when correct interpretation requires it.
3.3 Nonevidence for Structure-sensitivity
Many instructions directed at Kanzi are comprehensible without reference to phrase struc-
ture, typically by relying on a semantic soup strategy, even when they involve complex
constituents from the perspective of standard English phrase structure. I illustrate this with
reference to noun phrases, because (from the perspective of standard English grammar)
noun phrases are the locus of most of the complexity of the utterances directed at Kanzi.
Similar points hold, more trivially, of other would-be constituents.
17
NP
D
(A) N (RC)
that’s PP
P NP
D N
Figure 7: The maximal noun phrase structure used in instructions directed at Kanzi, from
the perspective of a standard English grammar.
The maximal noun phrase structure used in the instructions directed at Kanzi is given
in Figure 7. It consists of a determiner and a noun, possibly with an intervening adjective,
and possibly with a following relative clause of the form that’s PP, where PP describes a
location. Examples with adjectives are given in (3), and with relative clauses in (4).
(3) a. 563. (C) Show me the hot water. (Kanzi vocalizes.) Can you show me the hot
water? (Kanzi makes a sound like “hot,” then picks up a paint brush, [and]
points to the hot water with it, [. . . ])
b. 564. (C) Can you pour the ice water in the potty? Pour the ice water in the
potty. (Kanzi picks up the bowl of ice water and heads toward the potty.) E
[the experimenter] says, “That’s right.” (Kanzi pours the ice water carefully
into the potty.)
(4) a. 500. (C) Get the lighter that’s in the bedroom. (Kanzi does so.)
b. 508. (C) Go get the lighter that’s outdoors. (Kanzi goes to the play yard, picks
up the lighter, and [. . . eventually] brings the lighter back.)
In most cases, there is only one noun in the sentence that a modifier may plausibly relate
to, so a semantic soup strategy is sufficient to derive the correct association between mod-
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ifier and modifiee. For instance, (3a) and (4a) could produce an accurate response even if
interpreted as ‘show me water (“hot” is somehow relevant)’ and ‘get lighter (“outdoors” is
somehow relevant)’.
It is possible in principle to distinguish structure-sensitive interpretation of modifiers
from semantic soup, using even quite simple sentences. One way to do this would be using
multiple modifiers, each modifying a different noun, as in (5). Hierarchical structure would
facilitate the association of the right modifier with the right noun.
(5) a. Pour the hot water in the ice water.
b. Put the rock that’s outdoors on the TV that’s in the bedroom.
Unfortunately, such sentences are not tested in Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993). At present,
then, there is no evidence from modification patterns to warrant the inference that Kanzi’s
strategies for understanding English make reference to noun phrases as constituents.
3.4 When Structure-sensitivity is Necessary
Part of understanding the lexical semantics of a verb involves knowing how many argu-
ments it takes, or how many participants are involved in the event it describes. We know
that giving requires a giver, a receiver, and a thing given. Likewise, scaring requires a
scarer and a scaree. There is typically a 1–1 mapping between semantic participants and
noun phrases used to describe those participants.
In most natural languages, a noun phrase can be arbitrarily complex. One device for
creating complex noun phrases is NP-coordination, which creates noun phrases of the
form NP1 and NP2. These coordinated noun phrases occupy a single argumental position.
Correctly interpreting a coordinate noun phrase therefore requires an ability to represent
NP1 and NP2 as a constituent, whose reference is determined jointly by the component
noun phrases. In examples like (6), the interpretation is that the action of fetching is applied
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to the object denoted by each coordinated noun phrase.
(6) Fetch [[the ball] and [the rock]]
A dendrophobic grammar without hierarchical constituent structure might include a princi-
ple mapping nouns (or object-denoting words) to verbal arguments. Sentences containing a
coordinate noun phrase systematically violate such a principle, in that the number of nouns
is greater than the number of argumental noun phrases. This poses an interpretive chal-
lenge: if Fetch ball is a well-formed instruction to Kanzi,5 what is he to make of the extra
noun in Fetch ball rock?
Without a representation of constituency, three interpretations of NP-coordination are
likely. One might ignore the first noun, ignore the second noun, or interpret both as a coor-
dinated object (the fourth logical possibility, ignoring both nouns, would only multiply the
interpretive problems, as fetch would then be missing an argument). As a null hypothesis,
we might expect all three actions to be equally frequent. In that case, chance behaviour
would be to respond correctly 13 of the time, and to ignore each conjunct
1
3 of the time.
The number of relevant sentences in the Savage-Rumbaugh et al. corpus is small, but
the patterns conform to these predictions.6 The corpus contains 26 instructions given to
Kanzi involving a coordinated NP object. Eight of these are excluded under three different
criteria. First, in four cases (excluded under criterion a in the Appendix), Kanzi was asked
5There is no evidence that Kanzi interprets determiners or other functional material.
6My conclusions about Kanzi’s accuracy, based on the descriptions given, differ sub-
stantially from those reported in Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993: 78). That work reports the
following results: Kanzi: 721 correct trials, Alia:
12
21 correct trials. The difference between
these two proportions is not significant (p = 0.21, 2-tailed Fisher exact test). However,
there are reasons to suspect that these proportions do not fully reflect the subjects’ perfor-
mances. For fuller discussion of this discrepancy, see the Appendix.
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to interact with two other apes (Panbanisha and Panzee, or Sherman and Austin), in such a
way that it is impossible to tell whether he interpreted the instruction as referring to both
apes or to just one. For example, in (7a), Panbanisha and Panzee occupy the same area,
so it is unclear whether Kanzi intended to scare just Panbanisha, just Panzee, or the two of
them. Similarly, in (7b), giving a single orange to both Panbanisha and Panzee is highly
unlikely: he has to give it to one or the other.
(7) a. 293. (C)Get the monster mask and go scare Panbanisha and Panzee. [. . . Kanzi
spends a while looking for the mask] (Kanzi finds the mask and goes back to
the tool room with it to scare Panbanisha and Panzee [. . . ])
b. 311. (C4) Take the orange to Panban and Panzee. [. . . Kanzi initially tries to
eat the orange] Rose [. . . ] says, “Kanzi, stop.” (Kanzi puts the orange back
down on floor.) E says, “Pick it up and take it to Panban and Panzee. Carry it
to Panban and Panzee. You take it to them.” [. . . Kanzi gets E to open a door
for him] (Kanzi goes to the middle room door and tries to shove the orange
under; Rose comes and opens the door for him, and Kanzi takes the orange in
to Panban and Panzee. [. . . ])
Second, in two trials (excluded under criterion b in the Appendix), Kanzi was already in
contact with one of the two objects in question at the time of the instruction, and didn’t
perform any further action on that object as a result of the instruction, as in the following
cases.
(8) a. 271. (C) Show Sue the ball and the cereal. (Kanzi picks the cereal up as E
starts to talk. When he hears the sentence, he grabs the ball and tries to open
the door to give E the ball. He keeps the cereal in his lap but appears to be
attempting to show E the ball.) [C is scored because Kanzi picks up both
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requested objects. Whenever either subject is asked to ‘show’ something, they
are given the benefit of the doubt if they act on it in some way that could serve
to draw E’s attention and if E can see this.]
b. 297. (C) Show me the shot and the ball. (Kanzi shows E the shot and looks
at the ball that he is leaning on.) [C is scored because Kanzi has both items in
front of E and can reasonably presume that E will see them [. . . ]]
Finally (criterion c in the Appendix), in two cases, Kanzi interacted with both objects
named by the coordinate noun phrase, but not in the way requested. For instance, in re-
sponse to item 280, Give me the lighter and the water, Kanzi put the lighter in the water.
This trial will be ignored below, although Kanzi’s response is incorrect in an interesting
way, suggesting a default response involving a basic triadic action like putting.
Discarding these eight trials leaves 18 NP-coordination trials.7 Of these, Kanzi ignored
the first NP on 9 trials, as in (9a), ignored the second NP on 5 trials (9b), and responded
correctly to 4 trials (9c), an overall accuracy of 22.2%. Compared to his overall accuracy
across the corpus, this is a highly significant drop in performance (binomial test, p= 1.1×
10−5).
(9) a. 428. (PC) Give the water and the doggie to Rose. (Kanzi picks up the dog and
hands it to Rose.)
b. 526. (PC) Give the lighter and the shoe to Rose. (Kanzi hands Rose the lighter,
then points to some food in a bowl in the array that he would like to have to
eat.)
c. 281. (C) Give me the milk and the lighter. (Kanzi does so.)
7Most of these discarded trials were scored as correct in Savage-Rumbaugh et al.
(1993). As documented in the Appendix, this is the basis of the discrepancy between
results reported here and by Savage-Rumbaugh et al..
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The same trials were presented to a human infant, Alia. Alia’s accuracy across the whole
corpus was slightly lower, at 66%, but her accuracy on the NP-coordination trials is in-
distinguishable from this baseline, at 1319 , or 68.4%.
8 This suggests a species-specific,
construction-specific deficit. Kanzi marginally outperforms Alia across the whole corpus,
but he performs much worse than both his usual standard and the human control (Fisher
exact test, p= 0.008), on this one construction.
Although the deficit is treated as nonsignificant in Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993), it is
discussed as follows:
‘The simplicity of both the semantic and the syntactic components of type
2B sentences [those involving NP-coordination] suggests that Kanzi’s diffi-
culty was perhaps due more to short-term memory limitations on the overall
amount of information than to processing limitations on the information that
was available to him. Indeed, it seems possible that the semantic and syn-
tactic structure in sentences such as “Feed the doggie some milk” permitted
Kanzi to go beyond the typical constraints of his short-term memory system
by enabling him to process or chunk the information in a meaningful manner.
By contrast, sentences such as “Give the doggie and the milk” do not engage
semantic chunking strategies but rather force reliance on short-term memory
alone.’ (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1993, p. 85)
The considerations in Section 2 can help make this appeal to memory limitations precise:
Kanzi’s English comprehension dips precisely when successful comprehension requires
reference to the kind of memory required to process hierarchical phrase structure. In other
words, Kanzi suffers from dendrophobia.
8Again, see the Appendix for an explanation of discrepancies between the figures re-
ported here and those in Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1993).
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4. The Acquisition of Coordinate Structures
Kanzi may exhibit dendrophobia when faced with NP-coordination, but human infants are
hardly dendrophiles in this respect. Gertner & Fisher (2012) use a preferential looking
paradigm to examine 21-month-olds’ interpretations of sentences like (10).
(10) a. The boy is gorping the girl!
b. The boy and the girl are gorping!
c. The girl and the boy are gorping!
(10a) is a 2-noun sentence describing a transitive action. (10b–c) are 2-noun sentences
which, from the perspective of an adult grammar of English, describe an intransitive action,
with a single coordinated noun phrase describing the agents of that action. As described
in Section 3, this mismatch between the number of nouns and the number of noun phrases
severely affected Kanzi’s English comprehension.
Subjects were presented with two videos in parallel, one showing a transitive action
with a boy as agent and a girl as patient, and one showing coordinated intransitive actions
with the boy and girl both independently acting as agents. From an adult perspective,
the former matches the syntactic structure of (10a), while the latter matches the syntactic
structure of (10b–c). Indeed, the infants looked more to the transitive action when presented
with a transitive sentence. However, they also looked more to the transitive action when
presented with (10b), where the two nouns occur in the same order as (10a). In (10c), with
the order of the two nouns reversed, the subjects looked significantly less at the video of
the transitive action.
Gertner & Fisher suggest that this reflects a comprehension strategy in which infants
at this developmental stage rely on the number and relative order of nouns in a sentence,
rather than information about noun phrases as hierarchically structured constituents. This
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is similar to the description of Kanzi’s responses in Section 3. However, children even-
tually converge on a hierarchically structured representation of coordination, while Kanzi
apparently never has.
The emergence of hierarchical structure is gradual: Gertner & Fisher cite evidence from
Arunachalam et al. (2011) that 21-month-olds can already be biased towards a coordinate
interpretation through pronominalization of the coordinated noun phrases, as in (11).
(11) A: The man and the lady are going to moop.
B: Oh yes, they are going to moop. (Arunachalam et al. 2011: 22)
By 25 months, infants tend to associate transitive and coordinated intransitive actions with
transitive and coordinated sentences like those in (10) (Naigles 1990), just as 21-months
had failed to. However, 28-month old infants often still associate examples like (12) with
transitive actions (Hirsh-Pasek & Golinkoff 1996, Fisher 2002).
(12) Find Big Bird and Cookie Monster gorping! (Fisher 2002: 273)
This suggests that children only slowly learn to generalize a hierarchically structured rep-
resentation of NP-coordination across syntactic environments: they do not automatically
make maximal use of the resources at their disposal for phrase-structural representation.
This is not maximally dendrophilic behaviour, in that children continue to underuse hierar-
chical syntactic structure, relative to adult grammars, for several months. In other words,
humans are not natural dendrophiles, but Kanzi, who had not acquired the grammar of
NP-coordination by age 8, is a dendrophobe.
At the same time, other species seem to be able to make some limited use of nested
dependencies of the sort associated with recursively embedded constituents. For example,
Rey et al. (2012) show that baboons trained on the anbn pattern and presented with a1a2
stimuli, prefer to complete the pattern with the order b2b1 than any other. As predicted
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by the Dendrophilia hypothesis, then, but not by the recursion-only hypothesis of Hauser
et al. (2002), the inter-species differences described in this paper with respect to processing
and acquisition of hierarchical structure appear to be a matter of degree: nonhuman species
have some ability to pair strings with hierarchical structures, but humans do so much more
readily.
5. Conclusion
The results to date from cross-species comparison of grammars such as (ab)n and anbn
have been inconclusive. Although there is scope for further comparative investigation of
pattern-recognition abilities through artificial grammar learning, inferring general cognitive
capacities from limited, uninterpreted stringsets is inevitably a fraught task.
However, comparative evidence from English comprehension is broadly consistent with
Fitch & Hauser’s main claim of cross-species differences in recognition of hierarchical
sentence structure. Kanzi interprets the string NP1 and NP2 as equivalent to NP1 alone,
NP2 alone, or NP1 and NP2 together, seemingly at random. This is a construction in which
hierarchical structure is required to arrive at a coherent interpretation of the sentence, and
a major gap in Kanzi’s comprehension. In contrast, Alia, a human infant, had no such
problem in comprehension.
Nevertheless, children around the same age as Alia exhibit behaviour similar to Kanzi’s
in experiments designed to probe their comprehension of coordinate structures, and only
gradually come to associate NP1 and NP2 with an adult-like phrase structure across a full
range of sentence frames.
This suggests a modification to Fitch’s Dendrophilia hypothesis. There may well be
no special affinity between humans and trees, at least not when it comes to learning of
hierarchical structures underpinning natural languages. However, humans have a capacity
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to learn to recognize and manipulate such hierarchical structures when sufficient evidence
mandates it. Kanzi, it appears, does not, the cotton-top tamarins in Fitch & Hauser (2004)
did not, and the baboons in Rey et al. (2012) only did so under intensive training. In other
words, humans are not dendrophiles in this domain, but certain other well-studied species
are dendrophobes.
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